Bank of America, N.A., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Loraine Sundquist and John Doe/Jane Doe/Occupant Doug Kahler, an Individual, Defendants-Appellees. by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School 
BYU Law Digital Commons 
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) 
2017 
Bank of America, N.A., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Loraine Sundquist 
and John Doe/Jane Doe/Occupant Doug Kahler, an Individual, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah. 
Recommended Citation 
Brief of Appellant, Bank of America v Sundquist Doe D, No. 20170014 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2017). 
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/3680 
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital 
Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/
utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with 
questions or feedback. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BANK OF Al'v1ERICA, N.A., 
~ Plaintiff-Appellant, 
V. 
LORAINE SUNDQUIST and JOHN 
DOE/JANE DOE/OCCUPANT DOUG 
KAHLER, an individual, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
Case No. 20170014 
On Appeal from the Third District Court, Salt Lake County 
Case No. 110408730 EV (Judge Bruce C. Lubeckj 
OPENING BRIEF FOR BANK OF AMERICA 
J. KENT HOLLAND 
J. KENTHOLLAND; P.C. 
Post Office Box 902278 
Sandy,Utah 84090 
(801) 738-3181 
Attorneys for Loraine Sundquist 
ROBERT H. SCOTT 
AKERMA.NLLP 
170 South Main Street, Suite 950 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 907-6910 
Attorneys f or Bank of America, NA. 
May 25, 2017 
{41861742; 1} 
DANIEL S. VOLCHOK 
(pro hac vice pending) 
WILMER CUTLER PICKERJNG 
HALE AND DORR LLP 
1875 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W. 
Washington, D .C. 20006 
(202) 663-6000 
BRIAN E. PUMPHREY 
( admitted pro hac vice) 
McGUIRE WOODS LLP 
Gateway Plaza 
800 East Canal Street 
Richmond, Virginia 23219-3916 
(804) 775-7745 
Attorneys f or Bank of America, NA. 
FILED 
, UTAH APPELLATE COUP.TS 
MAY 2 5 2017 
~ 
~ 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
V. 
LORAINE SUNDQUIST and JOHN 
DOE/JANE DOE/OCCUPANT DOUG 
KAIIl.,ER, an individual, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
Case No. 20170014 
On Appeal from the Third District Court, Salt Lake County 
Case No. 110408730 EV (Judge Bruce C. LubeckJ 
OPENING BRIEF FOR BANK OF AMERICA 
J. KENT HOLLAND DANIELS. VOLCHOK 
J. KENT HOLLAND, P.C. (pro hac vice pending) 
Post Office Box 902278 WILMER CUTLER PICKERING 
Sandy, Utah 84090 HALE AND DORR LLP 
(801) 738-3181 187 5 Pennsylvania A venue N. W. 
Washington, D.C. 20006 · 
Attorneys for Loraine Sundquist (202) 663-6000 
BRIAN E. PUMPHREY 
ROBERT H. SCOTT ( admitted pro hac vice) 
AKERMANLLP McGUIRE WOODS LLP 
170 South Main Street, Suite 950 Gateway Plaza 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8410 I 800 East Canal- Street 
(801) 907-6910 Richmond, Virginia 23 219-3 916 
(804) 775-7745 
Attorneys for Bank of America, NA. 
Attorneys for Bank of America, NA. 
May25,2017 
{41861742;1} 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
The Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) originally filed this 
action against Loraine Sundquist and a second unknown defendant, listed as 
John/Jane Doe. That defendant has never been identifi~d, nor participated in this 
litigation in any way. 
Prior to the filing of this appeal, Bank of America was substituted for 
FNMA as plaintiff. 
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JURISDICTION 
The district court entered judgment and quieted title in favor of defendant 
Loraine Sundquist on December 21, 2016. R.2294-2297. Two days later, plaintiff 
Bank of America appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, which had jurisdiction 
under Utah Code§ 78A-3-102(3)G). R.2301-2303. That court transferred the 
appeal to this Court on January 6, 2017. R.2308-2309. This Court has jurisdiction 
under Utah Code § 78A-4-103(2)G). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether 12 U.S.C. § 92a and 12 C.F.R. § 9.7 permitted ReconTrust 
Company, N.A.-a national bank authorized to act as a trustee by the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)-to conduct a foreclosure sale of property in 
Utah because under federal law ReconTrust was located in Texas and Texas law 
permitted it to conduct such a sale. 
2. Whether, even ifReconTrust is located in Utah under federal law, it 
was authorized by federal law to conduct a foreclosure sale of property in Utah, 
because Utah permits such sales by entities that compete with national banks. 
These are both questions of law and hence reviewed de novo. State v. Rio 
Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990). The issues were raised in an 
eviction-hearing brief shortly after the case was filed. R.38-39. They were also 
decided by the Utah Supreme Court in an interlocutory appeal taken earlier in this 
{41861742;1}- 1 -
litigation-a decision that, Bank of America acknowledges, requires affirmance 
here by this Court. R.1082. Foil owing the Utah Supreme Court's decision, the 
district court entered a consent judgment, which "expressly reserve[ d]" Bank of 
America's "right to appeal ... , including the question of whether 12 U.S.C. § 92a 
and related regulations preempt Utah law and permit ReconTrust ... to exercise the 
power of sale for properties located in Utah." R.2295. 
STATUTES AND REGULATION INVOLVED 
Per Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(l 1), relevant portions of 12 
U.S.C. §92a, 12 C.F.R. § 9.7, and Utah Code§§ 57-1-21 and -23 are reproduced in 
the addendum to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case, Course Of Proceedings, And Disposition 
Below 
This is an appeal from a final judgment in favor of defendant Loraine 
Sundquist. In 2009, Sundquist defaulted on a loan secured by a deed of trust 
attached to real property in Utah. R.3. ReconTrust-a national bank and the 
successor trustee on the trust deed-noticed and conducted a non-judicial 
foreclosure sale of the property; the purchaser was the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (FNMA), also known as Fannie Mae. R.331-333, 335-336. FNMA 
then initiated this unlawful-detainer action after Sundquist refused to vacate the 
{41861742;1}- 2 -
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. ; .. 
property. Sundquist responded by filing numerous counterclaims, including a 
claim to quiet title in herself R.1280.:1286. 
After a hearing, the district court awarded possession of the. prQperty to 
.. 
FNMA pending the outcome of the litigation and ordered Sundquist to vacate. 
R.123. Sundquist filed an interlocutory appeal, challenging ReconTrust's authority 
to conduct the foreclosure sale. The Utah Supreme Court held that ReconTrust 
was not authorized to conduct the sale under Utah law, and that federal law did not 
preempt Utah law and authorize that conduct. R.1066-1084. 
On remand, the district court substituted Bank of America as plaintiff after 
FNMA executed a quitclaim deed for the subject property in favor of the bank. 
R.2267-2269. In light of the Utah Supreme Court's decision in the interlocutory 
appeal, the parties stipulated to a consent judgment in favor of Sundquist on the 
unlawful-detainer claim, and an order quieting title in Sundquist. R.2262-2265. 
The judgment and order, which the district court entered on December 21, 2016, 
expressly reserved Bank of America's right to appeal, including on whether federal 
law authorized ReconTrust to conduct the foreclosure sale. R.2281. 
B. Statutory Background 
1. Federal banking law 
a. Federal law authorizes national banks to make loans secured by real 
estate, 12 U.S.C. § 371; to acquire real property through foreclosure; and to hold, 
{41861742;1}- 3 -
manage, and convey such property, see id. § 29 (Second), (Third). See generally 
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 646, 1994 WL 271179, at *2 (Apr. 12, 1994) 
("Lending includes not only the initial extension: of credit but also collecting 
payments, foreclosing on collateral if the debtor defaults, and managing ... 
assets."). As an adjunct to these authorized activities, national banks regularly 
serve as trustees on deeds of trust securing real property. 
Federal law explicitly authorizes that activity as well. Specifically, 12 
U.S.C. § 92a prescribes the "[t]rust powers" of national banks. The statute 
authorizes the Comptroller of the Currency to grant to national banks "the right to 
act as trustee ... or in any other fiduciary capacity in which State banks, trust 
companies, or other corporations which come into competition with national banks 
are permitted to act under the laws of the State in which the national bank is 
located." 12 U.S.C. § 92a(a). The Comptroller may only grant such powers, 
however, "when not in contravention of State or local law." ld. 1 
1 Earlier in this litigation, the U.S. Solicitor General filed a brief that 
explained the statutory history: 
Section 92a was originally enacted in 1913 as part of the Federal 
Reserve Act, ch. 6, § 11 (k), 3 8 Stat. 262. In 1962, Congress removed 
Section 92a from th[ at] ... Act and transferred authority from the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to the OCC. See 
Act of Sept. 28, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-722, 76 Stat. 668. Although the 
provision was codified at 12 U.S.C. 92a, the 1962 statutory revision 
did not purport to amend the National Bank Act or place the provision 
{41861742;1}- 4 -
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The provision immediately after section 92a( a) clarifies this "not in 
contravention" phrase. It specifies that if a state authorizes the exercise of 
fiduciary powers "by State banks, trust companies, or other corporations which 
compete with national banks," then "the granting to and the exercise of such 
powers by national banks shall not be deemed to be in contravention of State or 
local law." 12 U.S.C. § 92a(b ). 
Federal law thus prevents states from discriminating against national banks 
in favor of state banks, trust companies, or other competitors, by authorizing 
national banks to perform any fiduciary duties that state law permits those 
competitors to perform and preempting contrary state law. The statute also gives 
the Comptroller the authority to "promulgate such regulations as he may deem 
necessary to enforce compliance with the provisions of this section and the proper 
exercise of the powers granted therein." 12 U.S.C. § 92aG); see also id. § 93a 
("[T]he Comptroller of the Currency is authorized to prescribe rules and 
regulations to carry out the responsibilities of the office."). 
As the federal banking regime contemplates, national banks frequently 
undertake their lending and fiduciary duties across state lines. The Comptroller 
therein. The provision is nevertheless commonly referred to as being 
part of National Bank Act, a convention followed in this brief 
U.S. Amicus Br. 2-3 n. l, Federal Nat 'l Mortg. Ass 'n v. Sundquist, No. 13-852 
(U.S. Oct. 7, 2014) (citation omitted). This brief follows the convention as well. 
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thus promulgated a regulation governing "[in]ulti-state fiduciary operations." 12 
C.F .R. § 9. 7. It confirms the authority of national banks to "act in a fiduciary 
capacity in any state," and more specifically to serve in any fiduciary capacity that 
a "state permits for its own state banks, trust companies, or other corporations that 
compete with national banks in that state." Id. § 9.7(a). The regulation also 
authorizes national banks, "[w]hile acting in a fiduciary capacity in one state," to 
market fiduciary services and act as a fiduciary for customers in other states-
including "act[ing] as fiduciary for relationships that include property located in 
other states." Id. § 9.7(b). 
b. Although section 92a( a) permits the Comptroller to authorize a 
national bank to act as a fiduciary "when not in contravention of State or local 
law," the statute does not state clearly which state's law must permit such fiduciary 
conduct. The Comptroller's regulation fills this gap, providing that "[fJor ·each · 
fiduciary relationship, the state referred to in section 92a is the state in which the 
bank acts in a fiduciary capacity for that relationship." 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(d). The 
regulation then elaborates that "[a] national bank acts in a fiduciary capacity in the 
state in which it [ 1] accepts the fiduciary appointment, [2] executes the documents 
that create the fiduciary relationship, and [3] makes discretionary decisions 
regarding the investment or distribution of fiduciary assets." Id. The Comptroller 
made these three "key" fiduciary functions the dispositive factors in order to 
{41861742;1}- 6 -
"provide clarity and certainty for national··banks' multi-state fiduciary activities." 
Fiduciary Activities of N_ational Banks, 66 Fed. Reg. 34,792, 34,792 (July 2, 
2001).2 
For purposes of authority to conduct the relevant activities, the 
Comptroller's regulation expressly preempts the law of states other than the one in 
which the national bank is located, providing that "[ e ]xcept for the state laws made 
applicable to national banks by virtue of 12 U.S.C. 92a, state laws limiting or 
establishing preconditions on the exercise of fiduciary powers are not applicable to 
national banks." 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(e)(2). Hence, if the Comptroller authorizes a 
national bank to act as a fiduciary, and the state in which the national bank is 
located-determined by the place where three core fiduciary acts occur-permits 
such conduct for state banks or other corporations that compete with national 
banks, then federal law permits the national bank to conduct those fiduciary 
activities nationwide, notwithstanding the law of any other state. National banks, 
however, are still subject to other states' laws that concern issues other than a 
bank's authority to engage in the fiduciary activity-for example, "state 
substantive laws that govern the fiduciary relationship." Fiduciary Activities of 
National Banks, 66 Fed. Reg. at 34,796. 
2 Although not the situation here, if a national bank carries out these three 
key activities in more than one state, then under the Comptroller's regulation, "the 
state in which the bank acts in a fiduciary capacity for section 92a purposes is the 
state that the bank designates from among those states." 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(d). 
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Finally, section 92a and the Comptroller's regulation gov~m fiduciary 
activities beyond real estate trusteeships, such as a national bank's "right to act as 
trustee, executor, administrator, registrar of stocks and bonds, guardian of estates, 
assignee, [or] receiver," 12 U.S.C. § 92a(a). National banks thus rely on section 
92a-and the OCC's interpretation of it-when they undertake a broad range of 
trust activities. 3 
2. Utah's trust deed statute 
Utah enacted its Trust Deed Act, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-1-19 to -36, in 
1961. Under that act, a trust deed "convey[ s] real property to a trustee ... to secure 
the performance of an obligation of the trustor or other person named in the deed to 
a beneficiary." Id. § 57-1-19(3). A trustee's obligations under such a deed include 
foreclosing on and selling the property if the borrower defaults. Id. § 57-1-23. 
3 See, e.g., OCC Interpretive Letter 1106, 2008 WL 7137071, at *3 (Oct. 10, 
2008) ( applying section 92a and the regulation to- a national bank's service as 
"personal representative for the estate of a person" domiciled in a state that 
purported to impose residency restrictions for executors); OCC Interpretive Letter 
973, 2003 WL 23675954 (Aug. 12, 2003) (national bank's service as indenture 
trustee on municipal bonds); OCC Interpretive Letter 872, 1999 WL 1251391, at 
* 1 (Oct. 28, 1999) (national bank's plan to offer "a full range of trust services" in 
California while conducting the "core functions that are essential to the creation 
and administration of the fiduciary relationship" in other states); OCC Interpretive 
Letter 866, 1999 WL 983923, at *1 (Oct. 8, 1999) (national bank's retail-trust 
business, which would establish "a retail brokerage account that holds cash, 
securities and similar financial products and ... provide[] a variety of trust services 
to assist in meeting a customer's estate, investment, and tax planning goals"). 
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Utah's statute authorizes a number of persons or entities to act as trustee of a 
trust deed, including active members of the Utah State bar, depository institutions 
or insurance companies, corporations authorized to conduct trust business in Utah, 
title insurance companies with an office in Utah, federal agencies, and associations 
or corporations licensed by the Farm Credit Administration. Utah Code Ann.§ 57-
l-2l{l)(a). Until 2001, any person or entity permitted to act as a trustee under the 
Utah Trust Deed Act could exercise the power of sale. That year, however, the 
Utah legislature limited the power to certain trustees. See 2001 Utah Laws 1074, 
ch. 236, § 2 (eff. Apr. 30, 2001). In particular, the power of sale may now be 
exercised only by: 
• an "active member of the Utah State Bar who maintains a place within 
the state where the trustor or other interested parties may meet with the 
trustee" or 
• a "title insurance company or agency that ... holds a certificate of 
authority or license ... to conduct insurance business in the state; ... is 
actually doing business in the state; and ... maintains a bona fide office 
in the state." 
~ Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-21(1)(a)(i), (iv); see also id. § 57-1-21(3). 
C. Prior Proceedings 
1. In 2006, Loraine Sundquist executed a deed of trust as security for a 
loan on her home in Draper, Utah. R.314-326. The deed named Mortgage 
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (as nominee for America's Wholesale 
Lender) as beneficiary. R.314-315. 
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Sundquist stopped making payments on the loan in 2009. At that time, 
i,• ••. 
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems appointed ReconTrust Company, a 
national bank chartered by the Comptroller and a wholly owned subsidiary of Bank 
of America, as the successor trustee. R.328-329. The substitution of trustee was 
executed and notarized in Texas. R.328. To document Sundquist's default, 
ReconTrust promptly recorded a notice of default and election to sell against the 
property-also executed in Texas. R.3 31-3 3 3. 
The beneficial interests under the trust deed were subsequently assigned to 
FNMA. R.335-336. Around the same time, ReconTrust initiated a non-judicial 
foreclosure. FNMA was the prevailing bidder (by credit bid) at the trustee's sale, 
so it received a trustee's deed conveying the property to it. R.338-340. Sundquist 
continued to live in the house after the foreclosure sale, however, despite receiving 
a notice to quit. R.11-18. 
2. In 2012, FNMA filed this unlawful-detainer action against Sundquist 
in the Third Judicial District Court. R.1-18. Sundquist counterclaimed for abuse 
of judicial process, quiet title, wrongful lien, trespass, wrongful foreclosure, and 
declaratory judgment. R.1276-1288. 
The district court scheduled an eviction hearing under Utah Code§ 78B-6-
810(2). R.26-27. In her pre-hearing brief, Sundquist contended that ReconTrust 
had wrongfully exercised the power of sale because it was neither a member of the 
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Utah State Bar nor a title insurance company with an office in Utah, and therefore 
was not authorized under the Trust Deed Act to conduct the sale. R.67. FNMA 
argued in response that ReconTrust, as a national bank, was authorized to conduct 
the sale under the National Bank Act (NBA), which preempts the Utah statute. 
R.120-121. Without specifically addressing this preemption argument, the trial 
court awarded FNMA possession of the property during the pendency of the 
litigation. R.123. 
3.a. The Utah Supreme Court granted Sundquist's petition for 
interlocutory review and reversed the eviction order. R. l 066-1084 (Federal Nat 'l 
Mortg. Ass 'n v. Sundquist, 2013 UT 45, 311 P.3d 1004). The court did not dispute 
FNMA's contention that under the Comptroller's regulation, ReconTrust was 
"located" in Texas "because the substitution of trustee, notice of default, and 
trustee's deed all were executed and notarized in Texas." Sundquist, 2013 UT 45, 
ii 16. Nor did the court disagree that ReconTrust had authority under Texas law to 
conduct the non-judicial foreclosure sale. Id. ,I 13 ( citing Tex. Fin. Code 
§§ 32.001, 182.001). The court nevertheless held that ReconTrust was barred from 
exercising the power of sale as to Sundquist's property because, on the court's 
reading of section 92a (as opposed to the regulation), ReconTrust was "located" in 
Utah when it conducted the sale and therefore had to follow Utah law in exercising 
its national-bank trustee authority. Id. ,I 3. 
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Recognizing that its decision was governed by Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the Utah Supreme Court 
first addressed whether the critical phrase in section 92a( a )-"the laws of the State 
in which the national bank is located"-is ambiguous. Sundquist, 2013 UT 45, 
,r,r 21-29. Relying on an on-line dictionary definition of "locate" ("to determine or 
indicate the place, site, or limits of' something, id. ,r 23), as well as on a senator's 
statement about a different provision of banking law, the court concluded that the 
term "located" in section 92a "is clear. A national bank is located ... where it acts 
or conducts business. And it certainly acts as a trustee in the state in which it 
liquidates trust assets." Id. ,r 25. 
The court also sought support for its reading by invoking two "substantive 
canons of statutory construction." Sundquist, 2013 UT 45, ,r 30. First, the court 
cited a canon requiring a clear statement from Congress of its intent to intrude in 
an area of traditional state prerogative-here, disposition of real property. Id. 
,r,r 31-32. Second, the court invoked an administrative-law canon that "deem[s] it 
highly unlikely that Congress would leave the determination of major policy 
questions to agency discretion, and thus require[ s] a clear statement of 
congressional intent to do so." Id. ilil 33-35. Seeing no clear statement to satisfy 
either of these canons, the court concluded that Congress's decision to expressly 




in any other fiduciary capacity ... under the laws of the State in which the national 
bank is located," 12 U.S.C. § 92a(a), did not entail any delegation of authority to 
construe the statutorily undefined term "located." Sundquist, 2013 UT 45, ,r,r 3 6-
. 38. 
Although its holding that the statutory term "located" is unambiguous 
sufficed to resolve the appeal, the Utah Supreme Court conducted a Ch~vron step-
two analysis, and concluded that the Comptroller's regulation interpreting section 
92a "is unreasonable-if not irrational-and therefore does not deserve 
deference." Sundquist, 2013 UT 45, ,r 39 (quotation marks omitted). More 
specifically, the court took issue with the three core fiduciary activities that, under 
the regulation, determine where a national bank is "located." It saw "nothing in 
the statute itself that ascribes any particular significance [to] these three particular 
acts." Id ,r 42. And in the court's view, the regulation was unreasonable because 
"missing from this list'' of relevant fiduciary activities is "where the bank engages 
in an act which liquidates the trust assets, e.g., engaging in a nonjudicial 
foreclosure of real property where the trust asset is located." Id. ( quotation marks 
omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court next addressed FNMA's alternative argument that 
even ifReconTrust was ''located" in Utah when it exercised its fiduciary duties, 
section 92a(b) authorized ReconTrust to conduct the challenged sale. Sundquist, 
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2013 UT 45, ,r,r 47-49. As noted, under that subsection, when a state permits the 
exercise of fiduciary powers "by State banks, trust companies, or other 
corporations which compete with national banks, ... the exercise of such powers 
by national banks shall not be deemed to be in contravention of State or local law 
within the meaning of this section." 12 U.S.C. § 92a(b ). The court stated, how-
ever, that, "[a]s a national bank, ReconTrust competes with Utah banks. It is not 
subject to competition from either members of the Utah State Bar or Utah title 
insurance companies." Sundquist, 2013" Ut 45, ,r 48. Accordingly, the court held, 
the Utah Trust Deed Act's grant of power to Utah title insurance companies to 
conduct foreclosure sales does not, under section 92a(b ), confer that same power 
on national banks. Id ,r 49. 
b. Justice Lee concurred in part and in the judgment. While embracing 
the majority's conclusion that Utah law governed ReconTrust's authority to sell 
real property located in Utah, Justice Lee disagreed with the majority's conclusion 
that the statutory phrase "laws of the State in which the national bank is located" is 
clear. Sundquist, 2013 UT 45, ,r,r 54, 56 (concurring opinion). To the contrary, he 
observed, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that "the term 'located' as it appears in 
the National Bank Act, has no fixed, plain meaning." Id. ,r 56 (citing Wachovia 
Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 313 (2006)). Justice Lee also offered a number of 
other "grammatically tenable" and "linguistically possible" definitions for 
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"located." Id. ,r,r 57-58, 60. He further disagreed with the majority's reliance on 
the legislative history of "an unrelated section of the NBA," explaining that 
because "'located' takes on different meanings throughout the NBA, it is by no 
means clear that legislative history concerning the use of the term in one section 
has any relevance to its use in another." Id. ,r 59 ( citation omitted). He 
nonetheless concurred in the judgment on the basis of the "clear statement rules" 
that the majority invoked. Id. ,r 61. 
4. FNMA petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. 
After receiving Sundquist's opposition and FNMA's reply brief, the Court invited 
the Solicitor General to file a brief expressing the views of the United States. In 
his brief, the Solicitor General stated not only that the Utah Supreme Court's 
decision was wrong and in conflict with U.S. Supreme Court precedent, but also 
that the issue was important enough to warrant certiorari because of its potential to 
harm the national banking industry. U.S. Amicus Br. 12-20, 22, Federal Nat'/ 
Mortg. Ass 'n v. Sundquist, No. 13-852 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2014) (hereafter U.S. 
Sundquist Br.). He nonetheless recommended denying FNMA's petition because, 
he argued, the interlocutory posture of the case made it unclear whether the U.S. 
Supreme Court had jurisdiction. Id. at 8-9. The Court denied certiorari in late 
2014. Federal Nat'l Mortg. Ass 'n v. Sundquist, 135 S. Ct. 475 (2014). 
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5. Following the remand, FNMA executed a quitclaim deed of the 
subject property in favor of Bank of America, R.2267-2269, and the parties 
successfully moved the district court to substitute the bank for FNMA under Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 25( c ), R.2262-2263. The parties also stipulated to entry of 
judgment and an order dismissing all of Sundquist' s counterclaims, entering 
judgment in favor of Sundquist on the unlawful-detainer claim "in light of' the 
Utah Supreme Court's decision in the interlocutory appeal, and quieting title in 
Sundquist against the trustee's deed issued to FNMA. R.2262-2263. The court 
entered the proposed consent judgment the same day. R.2294-2297. 
The consent judgment expressly "reserves [Bank of America's] right to 
appeal from this Judgment and Order, including the question of whether 12 U.S.C. 
§ 92a and related regulations preempt Utah law and permit ReconTrust Company, 
N.A. to exercise the power of sale for properties located in Utah." R.2295. Bank 
of America noticed this appeal two days later. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
As a national bank that had received the requisite authority from the 
Comptroller of the Currency, ReconTrust was authorized under federal law to act 
as a trustee and to conduct the foreclosure sale of Sundquist's ptoperty. Any Utah 
law to the contrary was preempted. Although the Utah Supreme Court reached a 
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contrary conclusion earlier in this litigation-which requires this Court to affirm-
Bank of America presents its arguments here to preserve them for further review. 
I.A. The National Bank Act authorizes the Comptroller to permit national 
banks "to act as trustee" or in other fiduciary capacities "when not in contravention 
of State or local law." 12 U.S.C. § 92a(a). The Comptroller's regulations clarify 
that a national bank's ability to act as a fiduciary is limited by the law of the state 
where the national bank "[1] accepts the fiduciary appointment, [2] executes the 
documents that create the fiduciary relationship, and [3] makes discretionary 
decisions regarding ... fiduciary assets." 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(d). Under this 
regulation, ReconTrust was located in Texas when it acted as trustee of the trust 
deed to Sundquist's property. And Texas law does not prohibit state banks or trust 
companies from conducting foreclosure sales. Accordingly, ReconTrust had the 
power to conduct such sales under section 92a. The law of any other state, 
including Utah, is inapplicable. Id. § 9.7(e). 
B. The Utah Supreme Court erred in holding that ReconTrust was subject 
to the restrictions of Utah law. The court should have honored the Comptroller's 
regulation because it constitutes a reasonable construction of an ambiguous statute. 
1. Title 12 U.S.C. § 92a is ambiguous regarding which state's law limits 
a national bank's powers as a fiduciary. In particular, it says that a national bank 
cannot act in contravention of the law of the state in which the bank is "located," 
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but does not indicate where a bank is "located" for these purposes. The Utah 
Supreme Court held that under the statute a national bank is "located in those 
places where it acts or conducts business.'' -Sundquist, 2013 UT 45, ,r,r 23, 25. But 
that interpretation does not render section 92a unambiguous because nothing in the 
statute indicates which activities are the relevant ones when a national bank "acts 
or conducts business" (id.) in multiple states. Lastly, two canons of statutory 
interpretation relied upon by the Utah Supreme Court do not render the statute 
unambiguous, either. 
2. The Comptroller's regulation is a reasonable construction of section 
92a. That regulation defines where a national bank is "located" based on three 
activities that are applicable regardless of the type of fiduciary relationship, thus 
establishing a clear and consistent rule for determining which state's law governs 
the bank's activities. The Utah Supreme Court's interpretation of section 92a, in 
contrast, would make a national bank's "location" tum on the object of the specific 
fiduciary activity, and could mean that a bank is located in multiple states even 
when acting in a single fiduciary capacity. Because the Comptroller's regulation 
reasonably promotes clarity and consistency for national banks, and does not 
conflict with any language in section 92a, the Utah Supreme Court erred in 
refusing to apply that regulation. 
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IL Even ifReconTrust were located in Utah under section 92a(a), federal 
law still permitted it to conduct the foreclosure sale of Sundquist's property. 
Under 12 U.S.C. § 92a(b ), if state law permits "[ s ]tate banks, trust companies, or 
other corporations which compete with national banks" to exercise fiduciary 
duties, then "the exercise of such powers by national banks shall ~ot be deemed to 
be in contravention of State or local law." Utah law permits title insurance 
companies to conduct non-judicial foreclosure sales, and title-insurance companies 
compete with national banks for business as trustees in providing foreclosure sale 
services. Accordingly, section 92a permits national banks to conduct foreclosure 
sales. 
ARGUMENT 
Federal law permitted ReconTrust to act as a trustee and conduct the fore-
closure sale of Sundquist' s property-and it preempted anything in Utah law to the 
contrary. Under section 92a and the Comptroller's regulation, ReconTrust was 
"located" in Texas for purposes of its role as trustee regarding Sundquist' s 
property; it was therefore restricted only by the limitations that Texas law places 
on fiduciaries. Because Texas law allows state banks and trust companies to act as 
trustees and to conduct foreclosure sales, ReconTrust was permitted by federal law 
to conduct such a sale in any state. Finally, even ifReconTrust were located in 
Utah, federal law would still permit it to conduct the foreclosure sale because Utah 
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law permits competitors of national banks ( specifically, title insurance companies) 
to conduct such sales. 
As explained, the Utah Supreme Court has already confronted these issues in 
this case, and decided them in Sundquist's favor. Bank of America of course 
maintains that that decision was erroneous, but it recognizes that this Court is 
bound by Sundquist and therefore required to affirm the judgment below. Bank of 
America thus presents its arguments here to preserve the issues for further 
appellate review. 
I. FEDERAL LAW AUTHORIZED RECONTRUST To CONDUCT THE FORE-
CLOSURE SALE IN UTAH BECAUSE SUCH CONDUCT Is NOT PROHIBITED BY 
THE LA w OF THE STATE WHERE REcoNTRUST w AS LOCATED 
The Utah Supreme Court held earlier in this litigation that Utah law barred 
ReconTrust from conducting the non-judicial foreclosure of the property at issue in 
this case. But ReconTrust is a federally chartered national banking association 
governed by the NBA. Its fiduciary activity was therefore subject only to the law 
of the state in which ReconTrust was "located." 12 U.S.C. § 92a(a). Under the 
Comptroller's regulation interpreting section 92a, that state was Texas. See 12 
C.F.R. § 9.7(d). And because Texas law permitted ReconTrust to conduct 
foreclosure sales, ReconTrust could exercise that power throughout the country, 
regardless of the law of the state where the trust property was located. 
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The Utah Supreme Court reached a contrary conclusion by deeming the 
word "located" in § 92a( a) unambiguous, and by dismissing the Comptroller's 
regulation as unreasonable. Those rulings were deeply flawed, and although law-
of-the-case doctrine allows a court not to reconsider matters it resolved in a prior 
ruling in the same case, see Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1038-
1039 (Utah 1995), a court may revisit an issue "when the court is convinced that its 
prior decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice," id. at 
1039. For reasons explained below, that standard is met here. Indeed, that the 
court erred is confirmed by the Tenth Circuit's intervening decision in Dutcher v. 
Matheson, 840 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2016), which held-in direct conflict with 
Sundquist-that 12 U.S.C. § 92a does not unambiguously require the application 
of Utah law, see 840 F.3d at 1199-1202; see also Garrett v. ReconTrust Co., NA., 
546 F. App'x 736, 738 (10th Cir. 2013). 
A. Under The Comptroller's Regulation, ReconTrust Was "Located" 
In Texas, Which Allowed ReconTrust's Conduct 
As the U.S. Supreme Court explained long ago, "[n]ational banks are 
instrumentalities of the federal government,'~ Davis v. Elmira Sav. Bank, 161 U.S. 
275,283 (1896), and possess the powers granted to them by federal law. One of 
the powers that Congress has authorized the Comptroller to grant national banks is 
"to act as trustee ... or in any other fiduciary capacity in which State banks, trust 
companies, or other corporations which come into competition with national banks 
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are permitted to act under the laws of the State in which the national bank is 
located." 12 U.S.C. § 92a(a). The Comptroller granted this power to ReconTrust, 
and hence it was permitted to "act as trustee" or in "any other fiduciary 
capacity"-albeit only when doing so was "not in contravention of State or local 
law." Jd. 4 
After full notice-and-comment rulemaking, the Comptroller promulgated a 
regulation clarifying which state's laws govern a national bank's ability to act as a 
trustee or other fiduciary, i.e., which state is referred to in section 92a's "not in 
contravention" clause. This regulation provides that: 
[T]he state referred to in section 92a is the state in which the bank acts 
in a fiduciary capacity. . . . A national bank acts in a fiduciary capacity 
in the state in which it [1] accepts the fiduciary appointment, 
[2] executes the documents that create the fiduciary relationship, and 
[3] makes discretionary decisions regarding the investment or 
distribution of fiduciary assets. 
12 C.F.R. § 9.7(d); accord id § 9.7(e)(l). 
Under this standard, ReconTrust "act[ed] in a fiduciary capacity" in Texas in 
conducting the foreclosure sale challenged in this case, because that is where it: 
( 1) accepted the fiduciary appointment to serve as successor trustee on the deed of 
4 The fiduciary powers granted under section 92a include the power acting 
as a trustee on a deed of trust and conducting trustee sales. See OCC Interpretive 
Letter, 1986 WL 143993, at *1-2 (June 13, 1986) ("act[ing] as trustee under deeds 
of trust in favor of [a] Bank as beneficiary" and "conduct[ing] trustee sales" are 
"permissible for a national bank as an aspect of trust powers granted by 12 U.S.C. 
§ 92a"). 
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trust, (2) executed the documents creating the fiduciary relationship, and (3) made 
discretionary decisions regarding the fiduciary assets. See R.328-329 (substitution 
of trustee executed and notarized in Texas); R.331-333 (notice of default and 
election-to-sell document executed and notarized in Texas); R.338-340 (trustee's 
deed executed and notarized in Texas). And because ReconTrust was acting as a 
fiduciary in Texas, its actions in that capacity were restricted only by Texas law-
not by any limitations that Utah law imposes on fiduciaries' authority. That is 
because the Comptroller's regulation provides, as noted, that " [ e ]xcept for the state 
laws made applicable to national banks by virtue of 12 U.S.C. 92a, state laws 
limiting or establishing preconditions on the exercise of fiduciary powers are not 
applicable to national banks." 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(e)(2). 
The fact that Texas was the only state whose law governed ReconTrust's 
challenged conduct establishes that that conduct was lawful, because Texas law 
permits state banks and trust companies to act as trustees and conduct foreclosure 
sales. See Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 32.00I(b) ("state bank[s] may ... act in a 
fiduciary capacity ... as ... trustee[s]"); id. § 182.00I(b) (same for state trust 
companies); Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 51.0001 (8) ( defining "trustee" as "a person or 
persons authorized to exercise the power of sale under ... a security instrument"); 
id. § 51. 007 4( a) ( authorizing trustees "to exercise the power of sale under a 
security instrument"). Because Texas law does not prohibit state banks or trust 
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companies from conducting foreclosure sale, section 92a(a) vested ReconTrust 
with the power to do the same. And ReconTrust could exercise that power 
nationwide, because doing so would not be "in contravention of State or local law 
... of the State in whi~h the national bank is located," i.e., the law of Texas. 12 
U.S.C. § 92a(a); see also 12 C.F.R. § 9.7(b) ("While acting in a fiduciary capacity 
in one state, a national bank may ... act as fiduciary for[] customers located in any 
state," including in "relationships that include property located in other states."). 
As the Comptroller put it in an interpretive letter, "[ o ]nee the state in which a 
national bank is acting in a fiduciary capacity is identified, the fiduciary services 
may be offered regardless of where the fiduciary customers reside or where 
property that is being administered is located." OCC Interpretive Letter No. 1103, 
2008 WL 7137068, at *2 (Sept. 18, 2008) (footnote omitted). 
B. The Utah Supreme Court Erred In Holding That Federal Law 
Did Not Authorize ReconTrust To Conduct The Challenged 
Foreclosure Sale 
In its earlier ruling in this case, the Utah Supreme Court rejected the fore-
going analysis, holding instead that ReconTrust's conduct of the challenged sale 
was unlawful because Utah law governed rather than Texas law. In reaching that 
conclusion, the court misapplied both steps of the Chevron framework. 
Under that framework, courts evaluating an agency's construction of a 
statute first consider "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question 
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at issue" in the statute itself. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. "If the intent of Congress 
is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give 
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Id. at 842-843. But "if 
the statute is silertt or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue," then courts 
proceed to the second step of the Chevron analysis: determining "whether the 
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Id. at 843. 
Here, the Utah Supreme Court should have concluded at Chevron step one 
that section 92a is ambiguous, and at Chevron step two that the Comptroller's 
regulation is a reasonable interpretation of the statute and therefore lawful. 
1. Section 92a is ambiguous as to which state's law applies to a 
national bank's fiduciary acts 
Although Congress provided that national banks may act in a fiduciary 
capacity "when not in contravention of State or local law," 12 U.S.C. § 92a(a), it 
did not specify which state's law governs. As the Tenth Circuit explained, "the 
statute simply does not provide any indication of where a bank is 'located' in 
~ situations like this one, where a bank operates out of one state but conducts 
foreclosures in another." Dutcher, 840 F.3d at 1199; see also Garrett, 546 
F. App'x at 738. 
The Utah Supreme Court disagreed in its interlocutory ruling in this case, 
concluding that the term "located" in section 92(a) is unambiguous. That is 
incorrect. 
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a. As an initial matter, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly 
recognized-specifically in the context of the NBA-that "[t]here is no enduring 
rigidity about the word 'located.'" Citizens & Southern Nat'/ Bank v. Bougas, 434 
U.S. 35, 44 (1977). Indeed, the Court elaborated more recently, "the term 
'located,' as it appears in the National Bank Act, has no fixed, plain meaning." 
Wachovia, 546 U.S. at 313. Instead, "its meaning depends on the context in and 
purpose for which it is used." Id. at 318. For example, the Court explained in 
Wachovia, "[i]n some [NBA] provisions, the word unquestionably refers to a 
single place: the site of the banking association's designated main office. In other 
provisions, 'located' apparently refers to or includes branch offices." Id. at 313 
( citations omitted). 
Even if it were true that "locate" had a clear meaning in this context, the 
meaning the Utah Supreme Court adopted does not warrant its conclusion that 
ReconTrust was "located" in Utah for purposes of the challenged foreclosure sale. 
Relying on a dictionary definition of "locate," the court asserted that "[a] national 
bank is located in those places where it acts or conducts business." Sundquist, 
2013 UT 45, ,r,r 23, 25. Whatever the merits of that assertion, the court leaped 
from it to the conclusion that a national bank "acts or conducts business" "in the 
state in which it liquidates trust assets." Id. ,r 25. That leap is unjustified. As the 




relevant ones." Dutcher, 840 F.3d at 1201; accord U.S. Sundquist Br. 17. 
Nothing, that is, indicates whether the pertinent conduct is the liquidation of trust 
assets ( as Sundquist held) or rather the conduct identified in the Comptroller's 
regulation. See Sundquist, 2013 UT 45, ,r 58 (Lee, J., concurring opinion in part 
and concurring in the judgment) ("The key question ... is what 'determines' ... a 
person['s] or entity's location. And that question is not at all answered-certainly 
not clearly or unambiguously-by the statutory text."). "On this barren statutory 
terrain," the Tenth Circuit explained in Dutcher, "one might just as well build a 
case that the relevant activities are the ones that the [Comptroller] identifies in 12 
[C.F.R.] § 9.7(d), such as, executing documents that create the fiduciary 
relationship or making discretionary decisions regarding the distribution of 
fiduciary assets." 840 F.3d at 1201. 
The legislative history that Sundquist cited does not support the court's 
ruling. The court relied on one senator's statement about section 1 l(k) of the 
Federal Reserve Act of 1913, which "allowed conversion of state banks to national 
banks '[p]rovided ... [t]hat said conversion shall not be in contravention of the 
State law.'" Sundquist, 2013 UT 45, ,r 27 (emphasis added) (quoting Federal 
Reserve·Act of 1913, ch. 6, §§ 8, 1 l(k), 38 Stat. 258,262 (1913)). This language, 
the court explained, was "put ... in to show that there was no purpose on the part 
of Congress to disregard the local State law, but merely to give its assent provided 
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the State law-permitted it to be done." Id. Because Congress used similar 
language in what later became section 92a, the court concluded "that Congress 
intended to preclude any inference that a national bank may disregard local State 
law in performing its duties as trustee." Id. ~ 28. 
Even setting aside the fact that individual members' statements are entitled 
to minimal weight in statutory interpretation, see, e.g., Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal 
Co., 534 U.S. 438,457 n.15 (2002), the flaw in this reasoning is that the legislative 
history-like section 92a itself-does not address the critical issue, namely which 
"State law" Congress was contemplating. Justice Lee recognized this, stating in 
his concurring opinion that "the cited legislative history does not answer the key 
question: Local to what? To the bank's physical location, or to the fiduciary acts 
it performs?" Sundquist, 2013 UT 45, ~ 59. Put another way, while the evident 
intent in the legislative history ( as in section 92a itself) was to respect "State law," 
the statute limits that respect to "the State in which the national bank is located." 
12 U.S.C. § 92a(a). To say that Congress wanted to respect state law-which is all 
the legislative history does-thus does nothing to answer the question of which 
state law is at issue, i.e., where the bank is "located." See Garrett, 546 F. App'x at 
739 (noting that even if Congress intended to put national banks on an equal basis 
with state banks, "that principle would most reasonably be tied to the 'State' in 
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which the national bank is 'located,' leading to the same ambiguity as an isolated 
textual analysis of Section 92a"). 
In short, the Utah Supreme Court's conclusion that "located" in section 92a 
is unambiguous directly conflicts with U.S. Supreme Court precedent, and is not 
saved by the legislative history the Utah Supreme Court cited. 
b. The Utah Supreme Court also attempted to bolster its reading of 
"located" by invoking two related clear-statement canons. Neither applies here. 
The court first pointed to the canon that a clear statement of congressional 
intent is required to "alter the usual constitutional balance between the States and 
the Federal government, or intrude on a field of traditional state sovereignty." 
Sundquist, 2013 UT 45, ,r 31 (citations and quotation marks omitted). That canon 
is inapplicable here because, as the U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized, 
Congress did alter the federal-state balance when it passed the NBA and related 
laws, and the regulatory scheme for national banks inherently contemplates a 
significant displacement of state regulatory authority. 
In particular, the Court has explained that "States can exercise no control 
over [national banks], nor in any wise affect their operation, except in so far as 
Congress may see proper to permit." Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat'l Bank v. 
Dearing, 91 U.S. 29, 34 (1875). In other words, federal law shields national banks 
from "the hazard of unfriendly legislation by the States." Tiffany v. National Bank 
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of Missouri, 85 U.S. 409, 413 (1873). The Court has reiterated this point more 
recently, stating that "in the context of national bank legislation," "grants of both 
enumerated and incidental 'powers' to national banks" are "not normally limited 
by, but rather ordinarily pre-empt[], contrary state law." Barnett Bank of Marion 
County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 32 (1996). Congress, that is, intended the 
NBA to supplant state law that would threaten-uniformity in the regulation of 
national banks. See Beneficial Nat'! Bankv. Anderson, 539 U.S. I, 10-11 (2003) 
("Uniform rules [regarding] ... national banks ... are an integral part of a banking 
system that needed protection from 'possible unfriendly State legislation.'"); 
Easton v. Iowa, 188 U.S. 220,229 (1903) (federal law contemplates national banks 
that are "independent, so far as powers conferred are concerned, of state legislation 
which, if permitted to be applicable, might impose limitations and restrictions as 
various and as numerous as the states"). Against this backdrop, no further 
statement of congressional intent in section 92a was necessary. See U.S. Sundquist 
Br. 18. 
Indeed, if there is any clear-statement rule in this context, it is the opposite 
of the one the Utah Supreme Court embraced. Because Congress "intended to 
facilitate ... a 'national banking system,"' the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, 
"[w]e would certainly be exceedingly reluctant to read ... a hiatus into the [federal 
banking laws] in the absence of evidence of specific congressional intent." 
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Marquette Nat'l Bankv. First a/Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 314-315, 318 
(1978). There is no such evidence in section 92a. 
The second clear-statement canon invoked by the Utah Supreme Court 
similarly lends no support to the court's holding. That canon provides that "absent 
a clear ... indication of congressional intent to leave ... questions [ of fundamental 
significance] up to agency discretion," a statute will be read to foreclose such a 
delegation. Sundquist, 2013 UT 45, ,r 35. As the U.S. Supreme Court has 
observed, however, that canon applies only in "extraordinary cases," FDA v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000), where "an 
agency's expansive construction of ... its own power would have wrought a 
fundamental change in the regulatory scheme," City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 
S. Ct. 1863, 1872 (2013). That is not the situation here. 
Section 92a{a) expressly "authorize[s]" the Comptroller "to grant [fiduciary 
powers] by special permit to national banks ... , when not in contravention of State 
or local law." The statute thus resolves the major policy question, allowing 
national banks to act as trustees or other fiduciaries by operation of federal law, 
subject to the limits of applicable state law. See U.S. Sundquist Br. 18-19. 
Although the statute does not resolve which state's law will apply to a national 
bank's conduct of its fiduciary duties, that is not a "major question[]" of policy, but 
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an "interstitial matter[]" that Congress presumably left to the agency to answer. 
Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159 (quotation marks omitted). 
Seeking to avoid this conclusion, the Utah Supreme Court characterized the 
Comptroller's regulation as taking the "monumental" step of "authorizing one state 
to regulate non-judicial sales for the foreclosure of real property in another state." 
Sundquist, 2013 UT 45, ,I 38. That description is inaccurate. The regulation (like 
section 92a itself) does not affect the application of substantive state law to 
national banks, including, with regard to the disposition of real property, the 
requirements of state foreclosure laws. See Fiduciary Activities of National Banks, 
66 Fed. Reg. at 34,796 ("Section 9.7(e) does not affect the applicability of state 
substantive laws that govern the fiduciary relationship, such as the standard of care 
to be exercised by the fiduciary, or ability of a grantor to designate which state's 
laws govern the trust itself."). The regulation is concerned only with authorizing 
national banks to carry on fiduciary activities, and with preventing states from 
imposing authorization requirements beyond those imposed by the state in which 
the national bank is located. Contrary to Sundquist' s suggestion, a national bank 
located in Texas and performing fiduciary duties in Utah "is [still] subject to Utah 
requirements governing the conduct of the foreclosure, including, for example, 
requirements pertaining to the notice that must be provided to the borrower." OCC 
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Amicus Br., Dutcher v. Matheson, No. 12-4150, 2013 WL 3795800, at *9 (10th 
Cir. July 12, 2013). 
The case the Utah Supreme Court principally relied on in discussing this 
second canon, Brown & :WUliamson, confirms that the "extraordinary" circum-
stances required to invoke the canon are not present here. Brown & Williamson 
concerned the authority of the FDA to regulate tobacco products against the 
backdrop of Congress having "created a distinct regulatory scheme for tobacco 
products, squarely rejected proposals to give the FDA jurisdiction over tobacco, 
and repeatedly acted to preclude any agency from exercising significant policy-
making authority in the area." 529 U.S. at 159-160. Those steps informed the 
Court's determination that Congress had spoken to the precise question at issue. 
There is no sound basis to reach a similar conclusion here, as Congress has taken 
no similar steps to preclude agency policymaking with respect to fiduciary powers. 
Finally, even if the canon applied, its clear-statement requirement would be 
satisfied. The question under the canon is simply whether Congress plainly 
delegated interpretive authority on a particular question to the agency. The answer 
here is yes: Congress designated the Comptroller as the official responsible for 
administering section 92a, and expressly vested him with full authority "to 
promulgate such regulations as he may deem necessary to enforce compliance with 
the provisions of this section and the proper exercise of the powers granted 
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therein." 12 U.S.C. § 92aG); see also id. §92a(a), (k); id. § 93a. Identifying the 
state whose laws will govern the conduct of fiduciary duties is certainly necessary 
to administer and enforce compliance with the provisions of section 92a(a). 
In sum-and as confirmed by the Tenth Circuit's contrary conclusion in 
Dutcher-the Utah Supreme Court gravely erred in holding that the term "located" 
in section 92a is unambiguous. 
2. The Comptroller's regulation is a reasonable construction of 
the statute and therefore entitled to judicial deference 
Sundquist also erred in deeming 12 C.F.R. § 9.7 "unreasonable-if not 
irrational," and hence not deserving of deference at Chevron step two. Sundquist, 
2013 UT 45, ,r 39. 
As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, an agency's interpretation of a 
statute need not be "the only reasonable one" in order to "gamer[] the Court's 
respect under Chevron." Astrue v. Capata ex rel. B.NC., 566 U.S. 541, 545 
(2012). Rather, courts must defer to any "permissible construction of the statute," 
even if it is not "the reading the court would have reached if the question initially 
had arisen in a judicial proceeding." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 & n.11. The Court 
has also specifically addressed deference to the Comptroller, saying that "[t]he 
Comptroller ... is charged with the enforcement of the banking laws to an extent 
that warrants the invocation of [ the rule of deference] with respect to his 
deliberative conclusions as to the meaning of these laws." NationsBank of North 
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Carolina, NA. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256-257 (1995); 
accord Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass 'n, 479 U.S. 388, 403-404 (1987). Indeed, 
the Court has stated that it "cannot come lightly to the conclusion that the 
Comptroller has authorized activity that violates the banking laws." Investment 
Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 626 (1971). That is particularly true here given 
that the Comptroller's interpretation is embodied in a "full-dress regulation ... 
adopted pursuant to the notice-and-comment procedures of the Administrative 
Procedure Act designed to assure due deliberation." Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), 
NA., 517 U.S. 735, 741 (1996). 
Under this precedent, the Comptroller's regulation easily warrants 
deference. Section 92a( a) enumerates a variety of fiduciary roles for national 
banks, including "trustee, executor, administrator, registrar of stocks and bonds, 
guardian of estates, assignee, receiver." It was manifestly reasonable for the 
Comptroller to define where a national bank is "located" by referring to activities 
that apply to all of these roles, rather than only some of them. That approach 
allows national banks to structure their various fiduciary activities in a way that 
subjects them to clear and consistent application of state law. Cf Fiduciary 
Activities of National Banks, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,543, 68,545 (Dec. 30, 1996) (final 
OCC rule adopting definition of "fiduciary capacity" in 12 C.F.R. § 9.2: "The OCC 
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believes that 'fiduciary capacity' should be defined in a manner that fosters 
consistent application of part 9 throughout the national banking system."). 
. .. 
The Utah Supreme Court's decision, by contrast, would make the location of 
a national bank tum on the object of the particular fiduciary activity in which the 
bank is engaged (here, real property). "Because a single trust may contain property 
located in several different States," this "property-based rule could subject a 
national bank's conduct of a single fiduciary relationship to the laws of several 
different States-a result that could 'throw into confusion the complex system of 
modem interstate banking.'" U.S. Sundquist Br. 17 ( quoting Marquette, 439 U.S. 
at 312). Under Sundquist's approach, moreover, a bank's location would vary 
from activity to activity. Indeed, a national bank could be "located" in multiple 
states even when serving as trustee for one trustor, based on the particular activity 
the bank was conducting. Section 92a does not compel such a confusing and 
inefficient result. Cf OCC Interpretive Letter No. 995, 2004 WL 3418856, at *2-3 
(June 22, 2004) ("For each fiduciary relationship, a national bank will refer to only 
one state's laws for purposes of defining the extent of its fiduciary powers pursuant 
to Section 92a. The Bank would look to the laws of that state to determine which 
fiduciary c~pacities it may engage in, and may then engage in any of these 
capacities for customers both in that state and in other states."). 
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Section 9.7's construction of section 92a is further supported by the careful 
explanation the Comptroller provided in promulgating the regulation. The 
. . 
Comptroller considered the history of how "located" was added to section 92a, and 
determined from that history and the attendant context that the state in which the 
national bank is located must be the one in which the bank acts in a fiduciary 
capacity. See Fiduciary Activities of National Banks, 66 Fed. Reg. at 34,794 n.6. 
The Comptroller also considered U.S. Supreme Court precedent emphasizing that 
state laws cannot prohibit or restrict out-of-state national banks from performing 
their federally authorized fiduciary powers. See id. at 34,795 & n.7 (citing Barnett 
Bank, 517 U.S. 25). Moreover, as the Comptroller has explained, the regulation 
codifies three prior OCC interpretive letters, reflecting consistency with the 
agency's prior positions on these issues. See id. at 34,792 (stating that§ 9.7 
"reflected positions taken" in OCC Interpretive Letters 695, 866, and 872); see 
also U.S. Sundquist Br. 15. 
The regulation is also consistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedent 
concerning other powers of a national bank. For example, construing another 
provision of the NBA that refers to the laws of the state in which a national bank is 
"located," 12 U.S.C. § 85, the Court approved the exportation of a national bank's 
interest-rate powers-and, as a result, the preemption of state usury laws. 
Marquette, 439 U.S. at 309-313. The Court held that a bank was "located" in, and 
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subject to the usury laws of, only the state in which it was chartered, even if it 
solicited residents of other states for credit cards to be used in transactions with 
merchants of other states. Id. Such an approach, the Court explained, furthers the 
purposes of the federal banking laws to create a "national banking system," where-
as a contrary rule would sow uncertainty because a "national bank could never be 
certain whether its contacts with residents of foreign States were sufficient to alter 
its location." Id. at 312, 315. The Comptroller's adoption of a highly similar 
approach suggests that his regulation is, at the very least, a permissible 
construction of the statute. 
The analysis that led the Utah Supreme Court to a contrary view is un-
tenable. The court began by stating that "[i]f [section] 92a is to mean what it says 
(i.e., the plain meaning), the reference to 'State or local law' at a minimum should 
be construed to mean the State in which the trust activity occurs." Sundquist, 2013 
UT 45, ,r 41 (brackets in original). Nothing in the statute, however, suggests that 
"State or local law" must be "construed to mean the State in which the trust 
activity occurs." Id. Again, what the statute refers to is "the State in which the 
national bank is located." 12 U.S.C. § 92a(a). The Utah Supreme Court 
improperly put its preferred gloss on section 92a and then faulted the Comptroller 
for adopting a regulation inconsistent with that gloss. That was error because the 
court's gloss is in no way compelled by the statutory text. 
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To the extent Sundquist was based on a lack of explicit congressional 
authority for the Comptroller to preempt Utah law, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
made clear that that a banking "regulation's force does not depend on express 
congressional authorization to displace state law." Fidelity Fed Sav. & Loan 
Ass 'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 154 (1982). In any event, 12 C.F.R. § 9.7 is 
consistent with a presumption that Congress intended to minimize the displace-
ment of state law. As the Comptroller explained, the regulation "does not mean 
that national banks may engage in fiduciary activities free from state-imposed 
restrictions. Rather, [it] simply identifies which state's laws will apply." OCC 
Interpretive Letter No. 866, 1999 WL 983923, at *5 (Oct. 8, 1999). Where a 
federal statute incorporates the law of one state, it is inevitable that conflicting law 
from any other state will be preempted. 
In short, because the Comptroller's approach to defining "located" 
reasonably promotes clarity and consistency for national banks across the range of 
fiduciary activities expressly permitted by section 92a, and does not conflict with 
any language in the statute, the Utah Supreme Court erred in refusing to defer to 
his interpretation-an error significant enough for the Court to revisit it notwith-
standing law of the case or stare decisis. Once that error is corrected, it is clear that 
ReconTrust was permitted to conduct the foreclos~e sale because it was located in 
Texas and its fiduciary activities were limited only by Texas law. 
{41861742;1}- 39 -
II. EVEN IF RECONTRUST WERE "LOCATED" IN UTAH, IT WAS AUTHORIZED 
To CONDUCT THE FORECLOSURE SALE UNDER SECTION 92a(b) BECAUSE 
UTAH LAW PERMITS COMPETITORS OF NATIONAL BANKS To CONDUCT 
SucHSALES 
Even if Sundquist were correct that ReconTrust was "located" in Utah under 
section 92a, federal law still authorized ReconTrust to conduct the challenged fore-
closure sale. As discussed, section 92a(a) authorizes the Comptroller to permit 
national banks to perform trust duties only so long such performance is not in 
contravention of state law. But section 92a(b) then limits the application of state 
laws that would disfavor national banks. It provides that: 
Whenever the laws of such State authorize or permit the exercise of 
any or all of the foregoing [fiduciary] powers by State banks, trust 
companies, or other corporations which compete with national banks, 
the granting to and the exercise of such powers by national banks shall 
not be deemed to be in contravention of State or local law within the 
meaning of this section. 
12 U.S.C. § 92a(b). As the U.S. Supreme Court explained long ago (addressing 
the predecessor statute), this language "says in a roundabout and polite but 
unmistakable way that whatever may be the State law, national banks having the 
permit of the [Comptroller] may act as [trustees] if trust companies [or other 
corporations] competing with them have that power." Missouri ex rel. Burnes 
Nat'! Bankv. Duncan, 265 U.S. 17, 23 (1924). 
This provision entitled ReconTrust to conduct the challenged foreclosure 
sale, ·because Utah law permits title-insurance companies to conduct non-judicial 
{41861742;1}- 40 -
~ 
foreclosure sales. Utah Code Ann.§ 57-1--2l{l)(a)(iv), (3); id. § 57-1-23. Under 
section 92a(b), therefore, ReconTrust may exercise the same power (assuming 
authorization from the Comptroller, of course) so long as title companies are "other 
corporations which compete with national banks." 12 U.S.C. § 92a(b). They are. 
As an initial matter, it is not disputed that ReconTrust, as a national bank, is 
authorized under federal law to serve as a trustee under a deed of trust, including in · 
Utah. Nor is it disputed that title insurance companies are authorized to act as 
trustees under Utah law. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-21(1)(a)(iv). Thus, national 
banks and title companies compete for business as trustees under deeds of trust. 
More specifically, national banks like ReconTrust, which provide foreclosure-
trustee services (and conduct foreclosure sales where permitted by law), are in 
direct competition with title-insurance companies in Utah that provide the same 
services. Hence, under section 92a(b ), it "shall not be deemed to be in 
contravention" of Utah law for national banks to perform any of the fiduciary 
duties that Utah law permits title insurance companies to perform, and a national 
bank permitted by the Comptroller to act as a trustee may exercise any of those 
duties. See Dutcher v. Matheson, 2012 WL 423379, at *7 (D. Utah Feb. 8, 2012) 
("Utah title companies compete with Recon[Trust] .... Accordingly, Recon[Trust] 
is entitled to the same privileges as a Utah title company."), vacated on other 
grounds, 733 F.3d 980, 990 (10th Cir. 2013). 
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The Utah Supreme Court rejected this argument in Sundquist, reasoning that 
"[a]s a national bank, ReconTrust competes with Utah banks" (which cannot 
exercise the power of sale), not with Utah attorneys or title insurance companies, 
and that "[i]t would be irrational to interpret§ 92a(b) or§ 9. 7 as giving a national 
bank ... authority to exercise a power that Utah law specifically prohibits even 
Utah banks from exercising." 2013 UT 45, ,r,r 48-49. But while national banks do 
compete with Utah banks, Sundquist's premise that Utah banks are the only Utah 
entities with which national banks compete is infirm. Indeed, section 92a(b) 
expressly contemplates that national banks compete with entities other than state 
banks-"trust companies" and "other corporations"-and gives national banks the 
powers that state law grants both to state banks and to these other entities. 
Congress intended to level the playing field between national banks and any of 
their competitors, and thus to preempt state laws favoring those competitors. 
Because Utah law grants competitors of national banks the power to conduct 
a foreclosure sale under a trust deed, section 92a entitled ReconTrust to do so as 
well. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court's judgment should be reversed, but Sundquist (though 
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12 U.S.C. § 92a. Trust powers 
(a) Authority of Comptroller of the Currency 
The Comptroller of the Currency shall be authorized and empowered to 
grant by special permit to national banks applying therefor, when not in 
contravention of State or local law, the right to act as trustee, executor, 
administrator, registrar of stocks and bonds, guardian of estates, assignee, receiver, 
or in any other fiduciary capacity in which State banks, trust companies, or other 
corporations which come into competition with national banks are permitted to act 
under the laws of the State in which the national bank is located. 
(b) Grant and exercise of powers deemed not in contravention of State or local 
law 
Whenever the laws of such State authorize or permit the exercise of any or 
all of the foregoing powers by State banks, trust companies, or other corporations 
which compete with national banks, the granting to and the exercise of such 
powers by national banks shall not be deemed to be in contravention of State or 
local law within the meaning of this section. 
(c) Segregation of fiduciary and general assets; separate books and records; 
access of State banking authorities to reports of examinations, books, records, 
and assets 
National banks exercising any or all of the powers enumerating1 in this 
section shall segregate all assets held in any fiduciary capacity from the general 
assets of the bank and shall keep a separate set of books and records showing in 
proper detail all transactions engaged in under authority of this section. The State 
banking authorities may have access to reports of examination made by the 
Comptroller of the Currency insofar as such reports relate to the trust department 
of such bank, but nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing the State 
banking authorities to examine the books, records, and assets of such bank . 
. 
So in original. Probably should be "enumerated". 
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( d) Prohibited operations; separate investment account; collateral for certain 
funds used in conduct of business 
No national bank shall receive in its trust department deposits of current 
funds subject to check or the deposit of checks, drafts, bills of exchange, or other 
items for collection or exchange purposes. Funds deposited or held in trust by the 
bank awaiting investment shall be carried in a separate account and shall not be 
used by the bank in the conduct of its business unless it shall first set aside in the 
trust department United States bonds or other securities approved by the 
Comptroller of the Currency. 
(e) Lien and claim upon bank failure 
In the event of the failure of such bank the owners of the funds held in trust 
for investment shall have a lien on the bonds or other securities so set apart in 
addition to their claim against the estate of the bank. 
(f) Deposits of securities for protection of private or court trusts; execution of 
and exemption from bond 
Whenever the laws of a State require corporations acting in a fiduciary 
capacity to deposit securities with the State authorities for the protection of private 
or court trusts, national banks so acting shall be required to make similar deposits 
and securities so deposited shall be held for the protection of private or court trusts, 
as provided by the State law. National banks in such cases shall not be required to 
execute the bond usually required of individuals if State corporations under similar 
circumstances are exempt from this requirement. National banks shall have power 
to execute such bond when so required by the laws of the State. 
(g) Officials' oath or affidavit 
In any case in which the laws of a State require that a corporation acting as 
trustee, executor, administrator, or in any capacity specified in this section, shall 
take an oath or make an affidavit, the president, vice president, cashier, or trust 
officer of such national bank may take the necessary oath or execute the necessary 
affidavit. 
(h) Loans of trust funds to officers and employees prohibited; penalties 
It shall be unlawful for any national banking association to lend any officer, 
director, or employee any funds held in trust und~r the powers conferred by this 
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section. Any officer, director, or employee making such loan, or to whom such 
loan is made, may be fined not more than$5,000, or imprisoned not more than five 
years, or may be both fined and imprisoned, in the discretion of the court. 
(i) Considerations determinative of grant or denial of applications; minimum 
capifal and surplus for issuance of permit 
In passing upon applications for permissiqn to exercise the powers 
enumerated in this section, the Comptroller of the Currency may take into 
consideration the amount of capital and surplus of the applying bank, whether or 
not such capital and surplus is sufficient under the circumstances of the case, the 
41; needs of the community to be served, and any other facts and circumstances that 
seem to him proper, and may grant or refuse the application accordingly: Provided, 
That no permit shall be issued to any national banking association having a capital 
and surplus less than the capital and surplus required by State law of State banks, 
trust companies, and corporations exercising such powers. 
G) Surrender of authorization; board resolution; Comptroller certification; 
activities affected; regulations 
Any national banking association desiring to surrender its right to exercise 
the powers granted under this section, in order to relieve itself of the necessity of 
complying with the requirements of this section, or to have returned to it any 
securities which it may have deposited with the State authorities for the protection 
of private or court trusts, or for any other purpose, may file with the Comptroller of 
the Currency a certified copy of a resolution of its board of directors signifying 
such desire. Upon receipt of such resolution, the Comptroller of the Currency, 
after satisfying himself that such bank has been relieved in accordance with State 
law of all duties as trustee, executory,2 administrator, registrar of stocks and bonds, 
guardian of estates, assignee, receiver, or other fiduciary, under court, private, or 
other appointments previously accepted under authority of this section, may, in his 
discretion, issue to such bank a certificate certifying that such bank is no longer 
authorized to exercise the powers granted by this section. Upon the issuance of 
such a certificate by the Comptroller of the Currency, such bank (1) shall no longer 
be subject to the provisions of this section or the regulations of the Comptroller of 
the Currency made pursuant thereto, (2) shall be entitled to have returned to it any 
securities which it may have deposited with the State authorities for the protection 
of private or court trusts, and (3) shall not exercise thereafter any of the powers 
2 So in original. Probably should be "executor,". 
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granted by this section without first applying for and obtaining a new permit to 
exercise such powers pursuant to the provisions of this section. The Comptroller 
of the Currency is authorized and empowered to promulgate such regulations as he 
may deem necessary to enforce compliance with the provi~ions of this section and 
the proper exercise of the powers granted therein. 
{k) Revocation; procedures applicable 
· (1) In addition to the authority conferred by other law, if,· in the opinion of 
the Comptroller of the Currency, a national banking association is unlawfully or 
unsoundly exercising, or has unlawfully or unsoundly exercised, or has failed for a 
period of five consecutive years to exercise, the powers granted by this section or 
otherwise fails or has failed to comply with the requirements of this section, the 
Comptroller may issue and serve upon the association a notice of intent to _revoke 
the authority of the association to exercise the powers granted by this section. The 
notice shall contain a statement of the facts constituting the alleged unlawful or 
unsound exercise of powers, or failure to exercise powers, or failure to comply, 
and shall fix a time and place at which a hearing will be held to determine whether 
an order revoking authority to exercise such powers should issue against the 
association. 
(2) Such hearing shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of 
section 1818(h) of this title, and subject to judicial review as provided in such 
section, and shall be fixed for a date not earlier than thirty days nor later than sixty 
days after service of such notice unless an earlier or later date is set by the 
Comptroller at the request of any association so served. 
(3) Unless the association so served shall appear at the hearing by a duly 
authorized representative, it shall be deemed to have consented to the issuance of 
the revocation order. In the event of such consent, or if upon the record made at 
any such hearing, the Comptroller shall find that any allegation specified in the 
notice of charges has been established, the Comptroller may issue and serve upon 
the association an order prohibiting it from accepting any new or additional trust 
accounts and revoking authority to exercise any and all powers granted by this 
section, except that such order shall permit the association to continue to service all 
previously accepted trust accounts pending their expeditious divestiture or 
termination. 
( 4) A revocation order shall become effective not earlier than the expiration 
of thirty days after service of such order upon the association so served ( except in 
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the case of a revocation order issued upon consent, which shall become effective at 
the time specified therein), and shall remain effective and enforceable, except to 
such extent as it is stayed, modified, terminated, or set aside by action of the 
Comptroller or a reviewing court. 
. . 
12 C.F.R. § 9.7 Multi-state fiduciary operations. 
(a) Acting in a fiduciary capacity in more than one state. Pursuant to 12 
U.S.C. 92a and this section, a national bank may act in a fiduciary capacity in any 
state. If a national bank acts, or proposes to act, in a fiduciary capacity in a 
particular state, the bank may act in the following specific capacities: 
(1) Any of the eight fiduciary capacities expressly listed in 12 U.S.C. 92a(a), 
unless the state prohibits its own state banks, trust companies, and other 
corporations that compete with national banks in that state from acting in that 
capacity; and 
(2) Any other fiduciary capacity the state permits for its own state banks, 
trust companies, or other corporations that compete with national banks in that 
state. 
(b) Serving customers in other states. While acting in a fiduciary capacity in 
one state, a national bank may market its fiduciary services to, and act as fiduciary 
for, customers located in any state, and it may act as fiduciary for relationships that 
include property located in other states. The bank may use a trust representative 
office for this purpose. 
( c) Offices in more than one state. A national bank with fiduciary powers 
may establish trust offices or trust representative offices in any state. 
(d) Determination of the state referred to in 12 US.C. 92a. For each 
fiduciary relationship, the state referred to in section 92a is the state in which the 
bank acts in a fiduciary capacity for that relationship. A national bank acts in a 
fiduciary capacity in the state in which it accepts the fiduciary appointment, 
executes the documents that create the fiduciary relationship, and makes 
discretionary decisions regarding the investment or distribution of fiduciary assets. 
If these activities take place in more than one state, then the state in which the bank 
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acts in a fiduciary capacity for section 92a purposes is the state that the bank 
designates from among those states. 
(e) Application of state law-(l) State laws used in section 92a. The state 
laws that apply to a national bank's fiduciary activities by virtue of 12 U.S.C. 92a 
are the laws of the state in which the bank acts in a fiduciary capacity. 
(2) Other state laws. Except for the state laws made applicable to national 
banks by virtue of 12 U.S.C. 92a, state laws limiting or establishing preconditions 
on the exercise of fiduciary powers are not applicable to national banks. 
Utah Code § 57-1-21. Trustees of trust deeds-Qualifications. 
( 1) (a) The trustee of a trust deed shall be: 
(i) any active member of the Utah State Bar who maintains a place 
within the state where the trustor or other interested parties may meet with the 
trustee to: 
(A) request information about what is required to reinstate or payoff 
the obligation secured by the trust deed; 
(B) deliver written communications to the lender as required by both 
the trust deed and by law; 
(C) deliver funds to reinstate or payoff the loan secured by the trust 
deed; or 
(D) deliver funds by a bidder at a foreclosure sale to pay for the 
purchase of the property secured by the trust deed; 
(ii) any depository institution as defined in Section 7-1-103, or 
insurance company authorized to do business and actually doing business in Utah 
under the laws of Utah or the United States; 
(iii) any corporation authorized to conduct a trust business and actually 
conducting a trust business in Utah under the laws of Utah or the United States; 
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(iv) any title insurance company or agency that: 
(A) holds a certificate of authority or license under Title 3 lA, 
Insurance Code, to conduct insurance business in the state; 
(B) is actually doing business in the state; and 
(C) maintains a bona fide office in the state; 
( v) any agency of the United States government; or 
(vi) any association or corporation that is licensed, chartered, or 
regulated by the Farm Credit Administration or its successor. 
(b) For purposes of this Subsection (1), a person maintains a bona fide 
office within the state if that person maintains a physical office in the state: 
(i) that is open to the public; 
(ii) that is staffed during regular business hours on regular business 
days;and 
(iii) at which a trustor of a trust deed may in person: 
(A) request information regarding a trust deed; or 
(B) deliver funds, including reinstatement or payoff funds. 
( c) This Subsection ( 1) is not applicable to a trustee of a trust deed 
existing prior to May 14, 1963, nor to any agreement that is supplemental to that 
trust deed. 
(d) The amendments in Laws of Utah 2002, Chapter 209, to this 
Subsection (1) apply only to a trustee that is appointed on or after May 6, 2002. 
(2) The trustee of a trust deed may not be the beneficiary of the trust deed, 
unless the beneficiary is qualified to be a trustee under Subsection (l)(a)(ii), (iii), 
(v), or (vi). 
(3) The power of sale conferred by Section 57-1-23 may only be exercised 
by the trustee of a trust deed if the trustee is qualified under Subsection (l)(a)(i) or 
(iv). 
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(4) A trust deed with an unqualified trustee or without a trustee shall be 
effective to create a lien on the trust property, but the power of~ale and other 
trustee powers under the trust deed may be exercised only if the beneficiary has 
appointed a qualified successor trustee under Section 57-1-22. 
Utah Code§ 57-1-23. Sale of trust property-
Power of trustee---Foreclosure of trust deed. 
The trustee who is qualified under Subsection 57-1-21(1)(a)(i) or (iv) is 
given the power of sale by which the trustee may exercise and cause the trust 
property to be sold in the manner provided in Sections 57-1-24 and 57-1-27, after a 
breach of an obligation for which the trust property is conveyed as security; or, at 
the option of the beneficiary, a trust deed may be foreclosed in the manner 
provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property. The power of 
sale may be exercised by the trustee without express provision for it in the trust 
deed. 
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